| 1 | COURT OF APPEALS |
|----|---|
| 2 | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| 3 | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, |
| 4 | |
| 5 | Appellant, |
| 6 | -against- NO. 38 |
| 7 | JOHN GIUCA, |
| 8 | Respondent. |
| 9 | 20 Eagle Street Albany, New York April 30, 2019 |
| 10 | Before: |
| 11 | CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE |
| 12 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN |
| 13 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON |
| 14 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN |
| 15 | Appearances: |
| 16 | LEONARD JOBLOVE, ADA |
| 17 | KINGS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Attorney for Appellant |
| 18 | 350 Jay Street, 19th Floor Brooklyn, NY 11201 |
| 19 | MARK A. BEDEROW, ESQ. |
| 20 | LAW OFFICE OF MARK A. BEDEROW, P.C. Attorney for Respondent |
| 21 | Carnegie Hall Tower 152 West 57th Street, 8th Floor |
| 22 | New York, NY 10019 |
| 23 | |
| 24 | |
| 25 | Karen Schiffmiller Official Court Transcriber |



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next appeal on this afternoon's calendar is appeal number 38, the People of the State of New York v. John Giuca.

Good afternoon, counsel.

MR. JOBLOVE: May it please the court, my name is Leonard Joblove for the appellant on this appeal by the People, and Your Honor, may I reserve three minutes for

2.1

rebuttal, please?

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, sir.

MR. JOBLOVE: After a hearing on the defendant's 440 motion, the court found that there was no proof of any understanding or agreement between the prosecutor and Mr. Avitto regarding providing any benefits to Mr. Avitto, and the Appellate Division did not disturb that finding of the 440 court.

As a result, there was no Brady disclosure obligation with respect to any alleged agreement, because as the First Circuit Court of Appeals has said, if there's no deal, then there's nothing about a deal to disclose.

JUDGE STEIN: When - - - when - - - you can see

the evidence of either a tacit or implied agreement or

understanding is - - - has to be disclosed, right? So at
- - at what point do the - - - do circumstances which would

tend to show an implied or informal understanding become

enough to - - - to prove that an unspoken understanding,

despite any protestation by the witness that there was none.

MR. JOBLOVE: That is the question in - - - in the case, Your Honor, and that's - - - that's - - - $\frac{1}{2}$

JUDGE STEIN: Right, and what - - - no, well, I - - the question in this case is whether that was established. My question is, is what do you think is necessary to establish that?

MR. JOBLOVE: Yes, Your Honor. There were have to be - - -

JUDGE STEIN: The rule, yeah.

MR. JOBLOVE: Yes, the - - - the evidence in question would have to provide a reasonable basis to infer, either that there was an actual agreement between the prosecutor and the witness, whether expressed or tacit, or even perhaps that, in the absence of an agreement, the information known to the witness might have given rise to a belief on his part that there was some expectation or hope on his part that he would get benefits.

And in this case, the evidence couldn't more convincingly refute any such inference, and perhaps the most obvious evidence that almost conclusively establishes that there could not have been an agreement was the fact that Mr. Avitto ultimately received the maximum authorized sentence that was permitted under his plea agreement.



JUDGE WILSON: But he didn't know that at the time of his testimony, right? He didn't know that at the time of his testimony at the murder trial.

MR. JOBLOVE: Well, that - - - that's correct,

Your Honor, but that was a fact that was before the judge deciding the 440 motion, and it was important - - an essential question for the 440 judge was to assess the credibility of the witnesses - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but - - - but - - -

MR. JOBLOVE: - - - who appeared before him.

JUDGE RIVERA: But if the rule includes what - - what the witness might ac - - expect or anticipate, a
belief, even if it doesn't pan out, right, that - - that's the rule, right? If it doesn't - - - it doesn't
matter whether it pans out or not, it's whether or not that
witness has the expectation of getting some benefit. And
the benefit might not be the one you're referring to,
correct?

MR. JOBLOVE: Well, yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE RIVERA: It might be some other benefit.

It need not be about the incarceratory period. It could be some other benefit, right? Perhaps not having to go back to jail for a violation.

MR. JOBLOVE: Well, that's certainly theoretically possible that there could be some other



expectation. But the argument that's being advanced in terms of the impeachment value of the undisclosed information, is that it would have given rise to an argument that there was a motive to lie to avoid facing that jail alternative of three-and-a-half to seven years.

2.1

2.2

And what the record shows, not just in terms of whether there was an agreement, but whether there was any expectation or hope on the part of Mr. Avitto, because when he was sentenced, he faced the sentencing court, approximately a year after the trial, so it's true this was not known at the time of the trial, there was not any argument made by either Mr. Avitto himself or his attorney that there was a deal, and okay, I'm entitled to some kind of benefit now, because I cooperated with the prosecutor.

There wasn't even a statement that, judge, you know, I thought there was a deal here, whether there was or wasn't. There wasn't even an argument by either the attorney or Mr. Avitto himself saying, judge, can you cut me a break, because I testified voluntarily, just to do my civic duty in this murder case a year ago. Even that didn't come up. So what better - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but as I understand your argument, it is that even if Avitto had some hope or expectation that he was going to be benefited by his testimony, that wasn't borne out by any - - - that wasn't a



reasonable hope or expectation, because there was nothing done or said by the - - - the prosecution that would reasonably have - - - have led someone to believe that. Is it - - - it - - - is it - - -

MR. JOBLOVE: Well - - -

2.2

JUDGE STEIN: - - - am I - - - is that your argument?

MR. JOBLOVE: Yes, Your Honor. That in - - - in that absence of an actual agreement, it's certainly possible that if there was a factual basis to believe that the witness had some expectation anyway - - - I know you didn't promise me anything, but I think good things are going to happen to me if I testify anyway - - - a statement like that, presumably that should be disclosed.

Or, if there's an array of circumstances that would reasonably lead to an inference that this might be what the witness was thinking, but at some point, the prosecutor can't be expected to get into the head of the witness and hear the fact that when he faced the three-and-a-half to seven, there was not a peep about, I thought I was going to get some kind of break, provides an insight into what - - what his thinking was.

And in this case, the only way that a narrative can be put together that even would remotely suggest, oh, maybe there was some belief on the witness' part, is really

by cherry-picking some of the facts out of this array of evidence that was introduced in its entirety before the 440 court. And to say, well, if you take out of context that the defendant was brought over to court by the prosecutor in this case, and then, lo and behold, he was allowed to stay out, if all you had was that information, you might say, maybe the witness thought that one thing had something to do with the other.

JUDGE STEIN: Well, when does it become a jury question?

MR. JOBLOVE: There would have to be some reasonable basis in the record from which a jury might be able to infer that this was an expectation on the part of the witness. And after all, under the Brady rule, materiality is an essential component of the Brady disclosure obligation.

JUDGE GARCIA: Going back to - - - to Judge
Wilson's question, I mean, when do we look at this? I
mean, you did have a long 440 hearing, and certain findings
were made. But at the time of the trial, here's a witness
testifying, and wouldn't it be relevant to their ability to
cross that witness, something along the lines of state-ofmind of an expectation, that it was this ADA, sitting right
next to you, sitting right in the well of the courtroom
that's prosecuting this case, that brought you to that

courtroom. Doesn't that add value to the impeachment of that witness at the time of the trial?

MR. JOBLOVE: Well, first of all, Your Honor, that fact would not come out in isolation, because after all, the alleged Brady violation here was not disclosing the circumstances surrounding the witness coming forward, the circumstances surrounding the prosecutor taking him to court, and there's no reason to believe that the evidence would have stopped just with regard to, okay, the prosecutor on this case brought you over. Well, what else happened is that when I met with the prosecutor in the office, they asked me - - she asked me, what am I looking for, and I said, I'm not looking for anything.

JUDGE RIVERA: But what is - - - why - - - why does the prosecutor get to go through that whole analysis and make that decision, as opposed to just to as Judge Stein asked you, why isn't that - - - you can make that argument to the jury. Why isn't that left for the jury to decide - - -

MR. JOBLOVE: Well, the - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - what to make of all these events that have gone on?

MR. JOBLOVE: It - - - it could be, and ordinarily that's for the jury to decide, but the question is whether there was a failure on the part of the People to



disclose information that, if disclosed, would create a 1 2 reasonable probability of changing the outcome of the 3 trial. And to expect the prosecutor, who has personal 4 knowledge - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: Probability or possibility? 6 JUDGE GARCIA: Possibility - - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: Was isn't probability instead of 8 possibility? 9 MR. JOBLOVE: Because there was - - - there was 10 no specific request in this case. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, let's say we disagree with 12 you, so argue your point under the reasonable possibility 13 standard. 14 MR. JOBLOVE: Right. So it's for the jury to 15 16 we're looking at is whether a prosecutor who knew that

MR. JOBLOVE: Right. So it's for the jury to decide based on the totality of the information. And what we're looking at is whether a prosecutor who knew that there was no cooperation agreement with this witness, because after all, that testimony was amply corroborated by the events at Mr. Avitto's sentencing and the credibility findings of the court.

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

25

JUDGE RIVERA: But yet that prosecutor might not really know if the witness has some expectation. They might - - - the prosecutor might think, well, that would be unreasonable; how could you think - - - how could you have such an expectation? I've never said anything to you;



you've never asked me for anything, right? And again, why isn't that all for the jury?

MR. JOBLOVE: It is, if - - - if this information came out and was put in front of the jury and then we had testimony from the executive ADA and the D - - - DA's Office about she meant about "special attention" and testimony from Sean Ryan about the conversations he had with the witness and testimony from the detectives about the fact that they were stunned, but in fact, the witness ultimately never asked for any benefit, it's clear enough how that would be evaluated by the jury.

And there's no reasonable possibility that that would change their assessment of the credibility of this witness, and particularly, where defense counsel, during his summation, was able to make precisely the argument.

The facts that were put before the jury - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But why work so hard not to let the jury hear it? Why not let the jury know that the prosecuting - - - the prosecutor was the one who walked the witness over to the courthouse and is the D - - - ADA who actually stood before the judge? Why - - - why not make that clear to, at least, defense counsel? Let defense counsel make use of it what defense counsel thinks is appropriate.

MR. JOBLOVE: Right, Your Honor, no one - - -



there's no evidence in this record that anybody worked hard to prevent any of that information from coming forward.

What we're looking at is, a prosecutor trying this case, when she knows that there's a cooperation agreement with a witness, in the case of Mr. Beharry, she disclosed it before he testified; she elicited it herself on direct examination of the witness.

was no basis to find that this witness would have any expectation of a benefit. I can only infer that it never occurred to her that there was anything to disclose. If it had occurred to her, it - - - she could have disclosed it, sure. There would have been nothing wrong with that, and there's every reason to believe, defense counsel wouldn't have used it, because eliciting the details about the narrative that led to this witness going to court, would have undermined the very argument he was able to make in summation about the pros - - about the witness having a motive to lie when he came forward to the police.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. BEDEROW: May it please the court, Mark Bederow for John Giuca.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Bederow, what's the evidence in the 440 record that would have allowed the jury to conclude that there may have been a tacit understanding



here?

2.1

2.2

MR. BEDEROW: Your Honor, John Avitto is a classic jailhouse informant, and the factual findings of the Appellate Division clearly establish that he was in a drug program. He left his program on June 9th. He triggered a lengthy prison sentence at that point. He knew a warrant had been issued for his arrest. And contrary to his testimony that he simply called his counselor and went back to court, what the jury didn't know is that, in fact, Mr. Avitto went to John Giuca's prosecutor to offer his cooperation.

The law of this state for decades has been that if a witness has a possible motive to lie, that it's got to be disclosed. That's been since Cwikla, and since before.

And what Mr. Joblove keeps talking about is an agreement or understanding. There doesn't need to be an agreement or understanding.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, before we get to that, just staying with the Chief Judge's question for a moment.

I'm having some trouble, or maybe a bit of confusion understanding exactly what the Appellate Division did here. So they said they did facts in law, but they said they weren't disturbing credibility determinations.

As - - as I understand the record at the 440, Mr. Avitto testified to this statement that he got - - he



1 left the program, and then he - - - the detectives 2 testified the other way. It's crystal clear, I think, in 3 the 440 record, that the 440 judge did not believe Mr. 4 Avitto, and made an absolute credibility finding, which the 5 Appellate Division says they are not disturbing. 6 So if you're accepting his lack of credibility, 7 and he's the only one to testify about that contact, where 8 do you get a finding that he contacted the detectives after 9 he left the program? 10 MR. BEDEROW: Your Honor, there is ample evidence in the record that other evidence that was credited by the 11 12 trial court was also demonstrative of the fact that Mr. 13 Avitto clearly had a motive. In - - -14 JUDGE GARCIA: No, but let's stick with my motive 15 right now. 16 MR. BEDEROW: In - - - in the Appellate Division 17 decision, they talk about a duty to disclose "the 18 circumstances surrounding Avitto's initial contact with the 19 police regarding" cooperating against Mr. Guica. 20 Obviously, if there is a duty to disclose, there's got to 21 be something that would have been favorable to the defense.

JUDGE GARCIA: Right. And I'm trying to figure out what that is, given the state of the record.

22

23

24

25

MR. BEDEROW: The - - - the first piece of evidence is the trial prosecutor's statement to the trial

court after Mr. Avitto testified, which was credited by the court. There was a demand for Rosario material that was made after the testimony. Specifically, the trial prosecutor said, I was present at every single meeting that occurred between the detectives and Mr. Avitto.

2.1

2.2

The trial prosecutor first met Mr. Avitto on June 13th, after he left the program. Additionally, in the EAC records, there is an entry from June 13th, in which a contemporaneous entry was made, in which Sean Ryan, the EAC counselor, indicated that the trial prosecutor told Mr. Ryan that Avitto contacted detectives on June 9th, the same day he left the program.

I think another critical point is this. At trial, all Mr. Avitto said was that I contacted the police some time in June. His credibility was a hotly contested issue, once he testified at this trial. It's strange credulity that in these circumstances, the prosecutor would not have asked Mr. Avitto or either of the detectives, who both testified at trial - - one of them testified only against the co-defendant - - but they never asked them the very simple question, when did you first meet Mr. Avitto? Where was he?

Had they done so, if he had been in his program as the People are arguing after the fact, then perhaps that would have minimized the possibility here.



| 1 | JUDGE RIVERA: So so in in |
|---|--|
| 2 | part, are you trying to argue that it it the A |
| 3 | doesn't say that it accepts those factual findings. It |
| 4 | says, "giving proper deference to the credibility |
| 5 | findings", but does have other findings of fact in that AD |
| 6 | decision that it may have found that the judge accepted |
| 7 | that credibility and could have thought that that's what |
| 8 | the police officers genuinely believed, but there's other |
| 9 | evidence that |
| 0 | MR. BEDEROW: Yes |
| 1 | JUDGE RIVERA: tilts this in a different |
| 2 | direction. |
| 3 | MR. BEDEROW: Your Your Honor, the reversa |
| 4 | is on the facts of the law. So obviously something |

is on the facts of the law. So obviously something factually had to be disagreed with, but also, the - - - the evidence in terms of a court - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: But - - - but in that writing from the Appellate Division, do they actually say what that facts are that they are changing?

MR. BEDEROW: They - - - they don't, Your Honor, but one important thing they don't say, is they don't say that there was no finding of a tacit agreement to bring it back to that. What the court said was that there was no expressed agreement, but there was a strong inference that the jury could have found that Avitto either expected a

benefit or had a motive to lie. So obviously, they did not 1 2 conclude that there was no tacit agreement. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so are you reading this 4 language in the Appellate Division decision, at a hearing 5 on the motion, the evidence demonstrated that "after Avitto" 6 left the drug program on June 9, 2005, he contacted police 7 that same day regarding providing information on the 8 defendant's case" as not being a factual finding? 9 MR. BEDEROW: No, that was a factual finding. 10 What I was reading, Your Honor, is on the next page where -11 12 JUDGE RIVERA: But that's what I'm saying, if 13 that's the factual finding - - -14 MR. BEDEROW: Well, the court - - -15 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - is it possible to read the -16 - - the paragraph at the end of the writing, that says, 17 "giving proper deference to the credibility findings", that 18 the judge may have indeed thought that witnesses were 19 testifying truthfully, but that the Appellate Division 20 panel was deciding this particular fact, based on the 21 evidence. 22 MR. BEDEROW: There is other credible evidence in 23 the record, which contradicts what the detectives said.

which juries do every day, when there's conflicting,

What the Appellate Division did was make a fact finding,

24

25

1 credible evidence.
2 JUDGE ST
3 JUDGE FE
4 go ahead.
5 JUDGE ST
6 about im - - imp
7 classic - 8 MR. BEDE
9 JUDGE ST
10 MR. BEDE

JUDGE STEIN: Well, my - - - my - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: Is that a fact - - - I'm sorry;

JUDGE STEIN: My question is, is that this is about im - - - impeaching - - - you - - - you called him a

MR. BEDEROW: Yes.

JUDGE STEIN: - - - jailhouse informant.

MR. BEDEROW: Yes.

DUDGE STEIN: But you know, getting - - - getting back to your adversary's point, if the prosecutor knew that no promises were made, and - - - and - - - and it just really never occurred to her that he was actually thinking that there was some tacit agreement here, the - - - the fact of the matter is, is that defense counsel cross-examined Avitto, like any jailhouse informant, and brought out his - - his incentive to - - - to testify falsely.

So what - - what would have prompted the - - - the prosecutor to think that anything more was required?

MR. BEDEROW: There's two critical points. The first is, there's testimony from the trial prosecutor that when she met with Avitto, Avitto said I wanted a different program. And something very important happened when they were walking back to court. It's in the trial prosecutor's



testimony. She said specifically that, I don't know what's going to happen; you may get remanded, but we're going to tell them what you said. And she did. She went to court and said that he cooperated, so he sees that. In his mind, is that something the jury could have determined would give him a motive to lie, or that he received - - -

2.1

2.2

JUDGE STEIN: Well, but is that the only question? You know, he - - - anything could be in his mind, but doesn't there have to be enough for the prosecutor to think, well, yeah, maybe - - - maybe he did expect this, and maybe there was something that I did to lead him to expect that, before the prosecutor has an obligation to disclose. In other words, the prosecutor can't be obligated to disclose something that he - - - that the prosecutor doesn't even realize exists.

MR. BEDEROW: Your Honor, I think another critical component of this, is something else the court said in Cwikla, which is this inference of an expectation of a benefit is increased when there is misleading conduct. And one thing the court should not avert its eyes to here, is that the Appellate Division also found that Avitto mislead the jury with his testimony about what happened. The prosecutor failed to correct that testimony, and in fact, emphasized and exploited it in summation.

JUDGE STEIN: But the record, I thought, wasn't



clear about whether the prosecutor knew about some of the additional - - - $\!\!\!\!$

2.1

2.2

MR. BEDEROW: Judge, the - - - the prosecutor was obviously present for all the critical events on June 13th. For some reason, in summation, what she chose to say was that Avitto simply called his counselor, and went back to court, and that he was released because the court found him responsible again and again.

The record is clear that that's the exact opposite of what happened with Avitto. Why would the prosecutor literally whitewash this from the narrative? Why didn't she simply correct the record and say, Mr. Avitto, the DA, who was that? It's you, Ms. Nicolazzi. Why wouldn't she do that? The next thing she did was say, it wasn't this judge. So she kept herself from this, but emphasized that Guica's judge was not the one who released Avitto.

JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, can I just clarify. Is the claim about the "benefit" limited to the potential jail time, the sentence, or is it limited to some other - - or is there a mention of any other benefit?

MR. BEDEROW: No, thank you, Your Honor. The benefits here were simply staying out of jail and not being remanded. He already had a plea agreement with the prosecution, so the benefits here were simply staying out



of jail, and the final point - - - I - - - I see my red light is on - - - to Judge Rivera's question is, it's obvious he benefitted. When he was in the program, doing well, he was in a restrictive environment at this program. When he violated the program, and left, but cooperated, what happened?

2.1

2.2

The DA told the court about this, and said, we want him to stay at his mother's, which is ROR, and from that point on throughout the time that he was a witness in this case, he was in a less restrictive environment. The jury had a right to know that. That's a benefit. He was in a much more favorable position, only because he violated his program, and he cooperated. And all of that was concealed from the jury.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. BEDEROW: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?

MR. JOBLOVE: Just to address - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, why - - - why - - - why isn't that true that it - - - it's not necessarily waiting for a benefit later on when it comes to an incarceratory period, but it's that a benefit has already been received, and there are these constant reminders of the benefit.

MR. JOBLOVE: Well, Your Honor's question assumes that there would be a basis to infer that the treatment of



the witness after he returned to court had anything to do with the prosecutor's conduct or the position at the DA's office. Once again, if the information that was elicited at the 440 hearing is viewed - -
JUDGE RIVERA: What's the point of saying he's cooperating if not to inform a judge - -
MR. JOBLOVE: Oh, they - - - this was - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - of a particular treatment you're looking for - - -

MR. JOBLOVE: Right. The - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - for this witness?

MR. JOBLOVE: The record - - - the records show that this witness was interviewed - - - came to the DA's office and was interviewed by the DA, in the presence of two or three detectives, and then at that meeting, volunteered that he had this warrant as a - - - as a result of having left the drug program on the 9th.

The prosecutor, knowing there was an open warrant, felt it was her duty to make sure that he's returned. Called the part, found the part was still up, and then went back to the part accompanying the witness.

The witness had - - - had explained to the prosecutor at that meeting, by the way, the reason I left the program isn't because I'm trying to avoid drug treatment; I didn't think that this particular program was meeting my needs, in

2 And so, she went over, approached the bench, was 3 able to transmit that information to the court, period. 4 And then she made clear, both in her testimony and in - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: Why isn't that a benefit? 6 isn't having the ADA do that a benefit? 7 MR. JOBLOVE: She was merely transmitting 8 information to the court and then taking a complete hands-9 off attitude, and in fact, communicated to EAC - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: But his own counsel couldn't do any of that? 11 12 MR. JOBLOVE: It had to be communicated to the 13 counselor. She wanted to make sure that information was 14 made known - - - made known to the judge. It was simply 15 transmitting the information, and that's what she testified 16 to. It's perfectly reasonable. 17 JUDGE FEINMAN: And this - - - and this is in the 18 drug treatment court, where it's not necessarily the 19 typical adversarial role. All of the participants there 20 are supposed to be promoting the goal of the treatment 21 court. 22 MR. JOBLOVE: Yes. 23 JUDGE FEINMAN: Whether it's the DA, the defense 24 counsel, the counselor, the judge. 25 MR. JOBLOVE: Yes, Your Honor. And there was

terms of my psychiatric history.

1

evidence at the hearing about multiple chances are - - - are common. This was a voluntary return on the warrant.

The trial prosecutor in the defendant's case made clear that she knew almost nothing about drug court. She was not familiar with it. She communicated - - -

2.2

JUDGE RIVERA: Because her goal isn't about the treatment court. Her goal is about ensuring this witness is available to her, and this witness is in a condition to come and testify in a way that's favorable to the prosecution.

MR. JOBLOVE: I dis - - - I disagree with the last part of Your Honor's question. It was clear from the record, that the goal of the DA's office here was simply to make sure that they knew where this witness was, in case - - - because he was a potential witness in this case. And all the communications fit that theme that, we just want to know where he is. And the prosecutor actually communicated to EAC, handle the case however you see fit; I am not making any recommendation. But - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But when - - - why are they then calling the DA's office before they go back to court with him, when they're considering throwing him out of a program?

MR. JOBLOVE: I don't believe that the record shows that there was a court date - - - I believe it was



September 6th where the court, the judge, is saying something to the effect that, I'm going to leave him out and I don't know what the position - - -JUDGE RIVERA: But I thought there were notes that showed that there was a call made to the prosecutor's office, couldn't get through, and sort of, that's part of that conversation to the court. Why make that call? MR. JOBLOVE: Well, the call was - - -JUDGE RIVERA: If - - - if - - - if all the DA's office is worried about is knowing the status, and has said, do whatever you want; we're on board with whatever you want to do, wouldn't you merely call them afterwards, not beforehand.

MR. JOBLOVE: Well, at least, again, I'm not sure spe - - - which specific date Your Honor's referring to, but for example on September 19th, which is while the trial was already underway, and that Mr. Avitto had been discharged from a program for bringing cigarettes into the program, and that there's notes from the EAC counselor - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, it's not the first time he had fallen, right?

MR. JOBLOVE: Oh, correct, Your Honor. That's correct. And there was ample evidence about the multiple chances that were given to defendants and the drug



treatment alternative option, but the point is, that on that date, the EAC counselor was notifying the prosecutor about his status, his whereabouts. He was expected to be called as a witness within days.

2.1

2.2

And if - - - if I may make just one more point going back to the question that was raised during defense counsel's argument about these - - - the testimony of both detectives regarding the fact that Mr. Avitto had come forward and talked to them and recounted the information regarding the defendant's admissions well before he had absconded from the drug program. And that would completely eliminate this whole argument that he only came forward because he had a motive to lie. That's the argument that defense counsel was able to make at the trial, but it wouldn't have been borne out if these facts had been elucidated.

And to say that the Appellate Division overturned the credibility findings of the 440 court regarding both of these detectives, which was further corroborated by Mr.

Avitto's own statements to the defense investigator, which were recorded, and which were in evidence at the hearing, where the defense investigator in 2013, well before this hearing, is apparently trying to elicit an issue about the timing from Mr. Avitto in the conversation. And despite five different tries, and this is at pages 2575 of the



record to 2577 of the record. So didn't you come forward after you had already been - - - after you already absconded from the program? No, it was before. I was - - I first came to talk to - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So do you - - - do you take the position that the Appellate Division could not have made a separate - - - a different, excuse me - - - factual finding from the hearing court as to when - - -

MR. JOBLOVE: It was - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - Mr. Avitto went to the police and the DA?

MR. JOBLOVE: It's generally within their authority to make credibility findings, and all they said about credibility findings is they were giving proper deference to the credibility findings of the court - - - of the 440 court, and their ability to reject credibility findings would presumably be limited to having support in the record, and I - - - there's not really support in the record here to do that.

But moreover, since when would they say that they're going to reject the credibility findings of the court with regard to not one, but two detectives, and not say that that's what they're doing? And all they say about deference and credibility is that they're deferring to the credibility findings of the 440 court.



| 1 | CHIE | F JUDO | GE I | DIFIORE: | Thank | you, | counsel. |
|----|------|--------|-------------|----------|-------|------|----------|
| 2 | MR. | JOBLOV | VE: | Thank | you. | | |
| 3 | (Cou | rt is | ad <u>-</u> | journed) | | | |
| 4 | | | | | | | |
| 5 | | | | | | | |
| 6 | | | | | | | |
| 7 | | | | | | | |
| 8 | | | | | | | |
| 9 | | | | | | | |
| 10 | | | | | | | |
| 11 | | | | | | | |
| 12 | | | | | | | |
| 13 | | | | | | | |
| 14 | | | | | | | |
| 15 | | | | | | | |
| 16 | | | | | | | |
| 17 | | | | | | | |
| 18 | | | | | | | |
| 19 | | | | | | | |
| 20 | | | | | | | |
| 21 | | | | | | | |
| 22 | | | | | | | |
| 23 | | | | | | | |
| 24 | | | | | | | |
| 25 | | | | | | | |



| 1 | | CERTIFICATION | | | | | |
|----|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | | | | | | | |
| 3 | I, K | aren Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing | | | | | |
| 4 | transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People | | | | | | |
| 5 | of the State of New York v. John Giuca, No. 38 was prepared | | | | | | |
| 6 | using the required transcription equipment and is a true | | | | | | |
| 7 | and accurate record of the proceedings. | | | | | | |
| 8 | | Wagen II M. M | | | | | |
| 9 | Kareg Schiffmille | | | | | | |
| 10 | Signature: | | | | | | |
| 11 | | | | | | | |
| 12 | | | | | | | |
| 13 | Agency Name: | eScribers | | | | | |
| 14 | | | | | | | |
| 15 | Address of Agency: | 352 Seventh Avenue | | | | | |
| 16 | | Suite 604 | | | | | |
| 17 | | New York, NY 10001 | | | | | |
| 18 | | | | | | | |
| 19 | Date: | May 05, 2019 | | | | | |
| 20 | | | | | | | |
| 21 | | | | | | | |
| 22 | | | | | | | |
| 23 | | | | | | | |

